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China’s venture capital market has recently witnessed tremendous development under the inﬂuence of cap-
ital internationalization and with support from the government. Venture capital (VC) generally refers to med-
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popular exit strategy because they bring the highest returns on VC investments. Thus, venture capitalists
(VCs) are the main participants in IPO activities and their behavior has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the operation
of the capital market. Accounting information is one of the major sources of information for the capital mar-
ket. Higher accounting information quality makes the allocation of capital market resources more eﬃcient and
gives investors more protection. Therefore, to protect investors more eﬀectively, the eﬀect of the participation
of VCs on the accounting information quality of IPO ﬁrms has received much attention.
Based on the framework of asymmetric information, Barry et al. (1990) and Sahlman (1990) proposed the
certiﬁcation/monitoring hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, VCs as professional investors play a certiﬁcation
role in the identiﬁcation of the portfolio ﬁrm’s intrinsic value. To reduce agency costs and increase the value of
portfolio ﬁrms, VCs as large shareholders will actively monitor the portfolio ﬁrms, including their accounting
information quality. Compared to companies without VC support, the earnings quality of VC-backed IPO
companies should be better. In contrast, Gompers (1996) and Lee and Wahal (2004) argue that the limited
lifetime and special organizational structure of IPO companies mean that VCs must pay attention to how
to get back their original investment and receive high returns, so VCs are likely to participate in portfolio
ﬁrms’ IPO activities opportunistically and have moral hazard problems. This hypothesis implies that VCs
may collude with portfolio ﬁrms or exert pressure on management, using their own professional advantages
or social networks2 with underwriters and government, to help the management of IPO ﬁrms manage account-
ing earnings before and during the IPO, thereby increasing the IPO price and increasing their investment
return following the IPO.
Institutional theory holds that the beliefs, goals and behavior of individuals and groups are inﬂuenced by
various institutional environments (Scott, 1987, 1995). Particular institutional environments will inevitably
lead to particular venture capital IPO behavior, including the eﬀect on accounting information quality in
IPO companies. Compared with the US market, China’s market has some special features. For example,
the Chinese government provides considerable guidance and support for VCs to promote innovation. In
September 1985, the State Council oﬃcially approved the establishment of the New Technology Venture
Investment Company, China’s ﬁrst franchised venture capital company. Since then, many VCs have been
established with the support of local governments, such as Beijing Venture Capital, Shanghai Venture Capital,
Suzhou High-tech Investment Company and the Shenzhen High-tech Investment Company (Chen et al.,
2011). However, the development of VCs in the US market is guided by market forces. Meanwhile, China’s
stock market is a newly emerging market with a short history and relatively weak investor protection. Thus, to
encourage long-term shareholding by VCs and reduce the negative eﬀects of equity selling immediately after
an IPO, the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC) mandated a lock-up period regulation, which
states that VCs are not allowed to sell their equity until at least 12 months after the IPO. In contrast, VCs
in the US market can sell their equity immediately after the IPO.
Most extant studies in this area are based on the mature Anglo-American market environment. Although
some research focuses on emerging Asian markets, few studies discuss China’s market speciﬁcally. In this
study, we use medium and small IPO ﬁrms in China from 2005 to 2009 as our sample, to study the partici-
pation of VCs on VC portfolio ﬁrms’ earnings management 1 year pre-IPO, in the IPO year and 1 year
post-IPO, thus allowing a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀect of VCs on accounting information quality
before and after the expiration of the lock-up period. After controlling for the sample self-selection endoge-
neity problem, we ﬁnd that the participation of VCs aﬀects the earnings management of IPO ﬁrms. Earnings
management is lower before the expiration of the lock-up period and higher after the lock-up period expires.
The empirical evidence thus supports the moral hazard hypothesis. Furthermore, due to ﬁnancing bottlenecks
and the poor corporate governance of non-state-owned enterprises, the participation of VCs has a greater
eﬀect on the extent of earnings management for non-state-owned enterprises before and after the expiration
of the lock-up period.1 In fact, VC refers to investment in the early stages of an enterprise. However, due to the short history of the venture capital market,
many VCs not only perform early-stage investment, but also pre-IPO investment. As it is hard to discriminate between them, we include
both types of VC in this study.
2 According to Chemmanur and Loutskina (2007), VCs often maintain close relationships with underwriters.
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tutional background in China and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research design and intro-
duces the data and variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and research hypotheses
There are two hypotheses on the eﬀect of VCs’ participation in their portfolio companies’ IPOs: certiﬁca-
tion/monitoring hypothesis and moral hazard hypothesis. These two hypotheses have diﬀerent implications
for the eﬀects of VC participation on the accounting information quality of IPO companies. Most studies
use earnings management as a proxy for accounting information quality, which refers to the behavior of
increasing accounting earnings in the current period by means of accounting accruals and real transaction
arrangements. Lower earnings management means higher accounting information quality.
In the US market, VCs are allowed to sell the shares of portfolio companies immediately after their IPO
and an IPO is the ﬁrst opportunity for a private ﬁrm to raise equity from dispersed investors. Therefore, most
of the studies based on the US market focus on the eﬀect of VC participation on accounting information qual-
ity in the pre-IPO and IPO process. The certiﬁcation/monitoring hypothesis predicts that to reduce agency
costs and establish their professional investor reputation, VCs should be actively involved in corporate gov-
ernance, including monitoring and motivating portfolio ﬁrms’ managers, which at the same time reduces the
conﬂict of interest between inside and outside investors (Baker and Gompers, 2003). This also means that VCs
should monitor accounting information quality, which is an important part of corporate governance. There is
some evidence to support this view. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) ﬁnd that information disclosure
in the IPO process is highly regulated. Although earnings management and less conservative information dis-
closure increase pre-IPO, this is reversed after the IPO, bringing serious economic consequences if discovered
by the market. Thus, to meet stock market requirements, private companies in the United Kingdom tend to
report more conservative accounting information several years prior to their IPO. The companies backed by
VC are inﬂuenced more by this force, because VC backing increases the predictability of listing compared with
non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Therefore, in the process of going public, VC-backed ﬁrms disclose losses as early as
possible to satisfy the future requirement of timely disclosure of information, which results in more conserva-
tive accounting information and less earnings management. Gioielli et al. (2008) compare the pre-IPO and
IPO discretionary accruals of VC-backed ﬁrms with those of non-VC-backed ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the earnings
management of VC-backed ﬁrms is less than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Hochberg (2003), Morsﬁeld and
Tan (2006) and Katz (2009) report similar ﬁndings. Moreover, VC-backed ﬁrms also have lower discretionary
accruals after IPO (Gioielli et al., 2008) and a lower likelihood of ﬁnancial restatements (Agrawal and Cooper,
2009). Accounting information quality also increases with the participation of more reputable and older VCs
(Agrawal and Cooper, 2009).
However, as an IPO is the ﬁrst time a private ﬁrm can raise equity from public investors, it also magniﬁes
the VC’s investment value, which exacerbates the moral hazard problem. To ensure a higher IPO price and
obtain higher returns on the sale of their equity during and after IPOs, VCs will help portfolio ﬁrms to manage
earnings, which leads to lower accounting information quality and further increases conﬂicts between insider
stakeholders and outsider investors. This view is also supported by a number of studies. For example,
Darrough and Rangan (2005) ﬁnd that VC-backed ﬁrms reduce R&D expenditures during the IPO year to
ensure higher accounting earnings. In addition to R&D expenditure arrangements, discretionary accruals have
also been used as a measure of earnings management. Using reverse leveraged buyouts as their sample, Chou
et al. (2006) ﬁnd sample ﬁrms manage earnings by discretionary accruals in the IPO year. Furthermore,
Wongsunwai (2007) documents that only the highest-quality VCs inhibit earnings management by means
of discretionary accruals, real transaction arrangements and ﬁnancial restatements in IPOs. At the same time,
as VCs usually occupy seats on their portfolio ﬁrms’ boards, are involved in their management and get the
information they need directly, they lack the incentive to monitor the quality of accounting information.
Hence, earnings management is not necessarily lower in VC-backed IPO companies and as the value of the
VC’s stakeholding increases, the information content of accounting earnings declines further (Cohen and
Langberg, 2006).
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environment has some special features as follows. First, under the inﬂuence of China’s traditional culture, VCs
give more help to portfolio ﬁrms in the establishment of social relations than in the provision of value-added
services. Hu and Bu (2012) show that companies backed by VCs with political connections are more likely to
have successful IPOs than companies backed by VCs with no political connections and only a few VCs help
portfolio ﬁrms to form strategic alliances with VCs’ parent companies or other companies. These factors
increase VCs’ moral hazard in earnings management during IPO. Second, as mentioned above, most VC com-
panies in China are owned by the government. Government-backed VCs are thus inﬂuenced by their public
functions, which reduces the incentive for VCs to monitor their portfolio ﬁrms as active shareholders. At
the same time, VC companies in China are often organized as limited liability corporations, which incur more
agency costs than partnerships, thus further reducing monitoring eﬃciency. Additionally, China’s capital mar-
ket is an emerging market without a long history. Although the regulatory systems are being improved, there
are still some problems with the market mechanism and support systems, which result in low investor protec-
tion and further exacerbate the moral hazard problem of VCs.
As the supply of venture capital cannot satisfy the current market demand in China, the reputation eﬀect
cannot reduce the moral hazard of VCs in the current environment. At the same time, the rapid changes in the
regulatory systems of emerging capital markets mean reduced safety for market participants. Therefore, to
realize their investment returns as early as possible, VCs will shorten the equity duration before the IPO
and sell their equity as soon as possible after the expiration of the lock-up period. If the pre-IPO duration
is not long enough, it is hard for VCs to establish a relationship with the portfolio ﬁrm and to be involved
in its operations and management during the IPO (Cao, 2009). However, our results show that in about
41% of portfolio ﬁrms, the lead VCs hold equity for less than 2 years pre-IPO and in about 10% of cases
for less than 1 year. For example, Huijin Lifang and Jinshi Investment were the two venture capital ﬁrms that
supported Shenzhou Taiyue. The duration of both companies’ pre-IPO equity holding was 165 days. Further-
more, selling equity immediately after the IPO can be a convincing interpretation of the opportunism of VC
participation in the IPO. We ﬁnd that almost 21% of VC-backed ﬁrms incur equity selling immediately after
the expiration of the lock-up period. For example, Tongzhou Electronics held its IPO on June 27, 2006, but
incurred equity selling by Dachen Venture, its VC investor, on June 27, 2007 – the exact date that the lock-up
period expired. The same thing happened with Western Material: on the ﬁrst day after the expiration of the
lock-up period, its VC, Shenzhen Innovation Investment, cashed in some of its equity.
The governance role played by the media in China’s capital market has been well documented (Li and Shen,
2010; Yu et al., 2010). The publicity given to the success stories of VC-backed entrepreneurs encourages more
entrepreneurs to seek help from venture capitalists. Entrepreneurs will favor VCs with better reputations.
Accordingly, VCs have an incentive to provide value-added services to portfolio ﬁrms to establish their pro-
fessional reputation. Furthermore, some foreign-owned VCs use their previous investment experience to mon-
itor the portfolio ﬁrms before and after the IPO, so that they can play a certiﬁcation/monitoring role.
The above two forces will have opposite eﬀects on the participation of VCs in an IPO, and will also have
diﬀerent eﬀects on the accounting information quality of IPO companies. As the above analysis shows, the
lock-up period in China’s market means that VCs sell their equity after the expiration of the lock-up period,
thus the key processes in the eﬀect of VC participation on accounting information quality include the IPO and
the expiration of the lock-up period. The pattern of portfolio ﬁrms’ IPO earnings management changes
accordingly.
If certiﬁcation/monitoring is dominant, VCs will not only inhibit earnings management before and during
the IPO to enhance accounting information quality and reduce the conﬂict between inside and outside inves-
tors, but they will also certify and monitor the portfolio IPO ﬁrms and inhibit the earnings management
induced by the insider trading of management and other non-controlling stakeholders after the expiration
of the lock-up period. However, if moral hazard is dominant, VCs will inevitably pay less attention to the
IPO process, because the relevance of the relationship between the IPO price and the VC’s investment return
decreases during the lock-up period, and focus more on equity selling after the expiration of the lock-up per-
iod. Due to the interaction between accounting earnings in consecutive periods, VCs will treat the IPO and the
expiration of the lock-up period as a whole and design a dynamic earnings management strategy. In order to
reverse accounting earnings in the year in which the lock-up period expires, the earnings management of
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backed ﬁrms. Because VCs in China’s market tend to select ﬁrms with high growth and excellent ﬁnancial per-
formance (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 2003), the appropriate reduction in accounting earnings before and during
the IPO will not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on IPO pricing. Meanwhile, improvements in the IPO regulatory sys-
tem have increased the cost of earnings management (Xu and Chen, 2009). Thus, the earnings management of
VC-backed ﬁrms before the lock-up period expires will be even lower than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms.
Based on the above analysis, we propose our ﬁrst hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. The participation of VCs will inﬂuence earnings management before and after the expiration of
the lock-up period.
Hypothesis 1a. The participation of VCs will reduce earnings management before the expiration of the lock-
up period (i.e., 1 year before the IPO and the IPO year itself) and the year in which the lock-up period expires
(i.e., 1 year after the IPO).
Hypothesis 1b. The participation of VCs will increase earnings management in the year of the lock-up period
expiration (i.e., 1 year after the IPO) and reduce earnings management before the expiration of the lock-up
period (i.e., 1 year before the IPO and the year of the IPO itself).
In China, state-owned enterprises have a natural relationship with banks, which gives them advantages in
accessing bank loans. In a survey of rural commercial banks in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, Brandt and Li
(2003) show that banks treat enterprises with diﬀerent types of ownership diﬀerently when awarding bank
loans, indicating “ﬁnancial discrimination.” Fang (2010) compares state-owned industrial enterprises and for-
eign-funded industrial enterprises, and further documents the existence of “ﬁnancial discrimination” in the
process of allocating bank loans. The result of ﬁnancial discrimination is that non-state-owned enterprises
in need of funding ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to obtain bank loans, thus increasing the demand for funds. Under
this circumstance, VCs that can provide development funds to non-state-owned enterprises will have stronger
bargaining power in their negotiations with them. Meanwhile, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2007) ﬁnd that
VCs help to market their portfolio ﬁrms to analysts, investment banks and institutional investors. We believe
that non-state-owned enterprises with fewer political connections have a stronger need for the marketing
power of VCs during the IPO process, thus further increasing the bargaining power of VCs. Therefore,
VCs will have a more signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the corporate governance, operations and ﬁnancial behavior
of non-state-owned enterprises than on state-owned enterprises.
According to Hao et al. (2011), during the 30 years since China’s reform and opening-up, state-owned
enterprises have experienced the decentralization reform, contracting reform, joint-stock pilot, and modern
enterprise system reform. They have developed into new state-owned enterprises with “clear property rights,
well-deﬁned power and responsibility, separation of political function and business operation, scientiﬁc man-
agement.” The governance structure of state-owned enterprises has further improved, especially since the
establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission in 2003. Using enter-
prises in Shandong Province from 2002 to 2009 as their sample, they show that the total governance eﬃciency3
of state-owned enterprises, with the exception of enterprises wholly owned by the state, is better than that of
non-state-owned enterprises and foreign enterprises. Gao and Cai (2011) also ﬁnd the ﬁnancial governance of
state-owned listed companies to be signiﬁcantly better than that of non-state-owned listed companies. There-
fore, we argue that the more robust system in new state-owned enterprises inhibits the negative eﬀect of VC
participation on enterprises under the new regulatory environment. This leads to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. VC participation has a greater eﬀect on earnings management before and after the lock-up
period for non-state-owned enterprises than for state-owned enterprises.3 In their paper, total enterprise governance eﬃciency is measured as the sum of operational eﬃciency aimed at making proﬁts and
functional eﬃciency for the purpose of maximizing social welfare.
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3.1. Sample selection
As the lock-up period for most VCs is 1 year according to the CSRC, we select 1 year after IPO as the year
of the expiration of the lock-up period (referred to as the post-IPO year). Because accruals in the year before
IPO and the IPO year provide a valid test of earnings management (Teoh et al., 1998; Ball and Shivakumar,
2008), we use discretionary accruals in these 2 years as our measure of accounting information quality before
the expiration of the lock-up period. We use a sample of 323 companies that held their IPO on the Shenzhen
Small and Medium Enterprises Board (SME Board) and the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) between 2005
and 2009. We delete IPO ﬁrms with the two-digit SIC code C2 because there are fewer than 10, making it hard
to get an appropriate estimation of discretionary accruals. We also delete one other company with missing
ﬁnancial data. Finally, we have a sample size of 320 companies in each ﬁrm year. We obtain detailed VC data
by checking the information from the CV-source with the prospectus, obtain ﬁnancial data from the Wind
database, prospectus and annual reports, and the rankings of underwriters and auditors from the websiteTable 1
Sample selection.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Panel A: Sample selection
IPO companies 11 56 101 65 90 323
Less: data missing 0 0 1 0 0 1
SIC code C2 0 0 0 2 0 2
Final sample 11 56 100 63 90 320
VC-backed Non-VC-backed Total VC-backed (%)
Panel B: VC-backing
2005 2 9 11 18.18
2006 13 43 56 23.21
2007 28 72 100 28.00
2008 19 44 63 30.16
2009 50 40 90 55.56
Total 112 208 320 35.00
VC-backed % Non-VC-backed % Total %
Panel C: Industry distribution
A – Agriculture, forestry, animal
husbandry and ﬁshery
2 1.79 5 2.40 7 2.19
B – Mining 1 0.89 2 0.96 3 0.94
C0 – Food and beverage 3 2.68 7 3.37 10 3.13
C1 – Textiles, clothing, fur 1 0.89 13 6.25 14 4.38
C3 – Papermaking, printing 3 2.68 10 4.81 13 4.06
C4 – Oil, chemical, rubber, plastic 6 5.36 30 14.42 36 11.25
C5 – Electronics 16 14.29 15 7.21 31 9.69
C6 – Metal and non-metal 11 9.82 20 9.62 31 9.69
C7 – Machinery, equipment, instruments 32 28.57 35 16.83 67 20.94
C8 – Pharmaceutical, bio-products 5 4.46 10 4.81 15 4.69
C9 – Other manufacturing 2 1.79 8 3.85 10 3.13
D – Electric, gas, water production and supply 0 0.00 2 0.96 2 0.63
E – Architecture 2 1.79 6 2.88 8 2.50
F – Transportation, warehousing 1 0.89 2 0.96 3 0.94
G – Information technology 20 17.86 17 8.17 37 11.56
H – Wholesale and retail trade 2 1.79 7 3.37 9 2.81
J – Real estate 1 0.89 5 2.40 6 1.88
K – Social services 4 3.57 10 4.81 14 4.38
L – Communication and culture 0 0.00 3 1.44 3 0.94
M – Comprehensive 0 0.00 1 0.48 1 0.31
Total 112 100 208 100 320 100
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VC-backing frequency and Panel C shows the industry distribution.
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the stock market boom in 2007 led to 101 IPOs in that year, which was the
highest number during the ﬁve consecutive sample years. The second highest was 90 IPOs in 2009, the year
that China launched GEM. Panel B reports the descriptive results for the number of sample ﬁrms that received
VC-backing. It seems that VCs participated actively in the capital market, with one third of IPOs backed by
VCs. The percentage of ﬁrms backed by VCs increased throughout the period, reaching 55.56% in 2009.
According to Panel C, VCs give more support to the electronics industry, the machinery, equipment and
instrument industry, and the information technology industry. The percentages of VC-backed sample ﬁrms
in these three industries are 16%, 28.57% and 17.86% respectively, and the proportions in the overall sample
are 9.69%, 20.94% and 11.56%.
3.2. Research design
According to Katz (2009), we use the following model to test the eﬀect of VC participation on the earnings
management of IPO ﬁrms:4 Fo
SIC.DAt ¼ a0 þ a1VCt þ a2Sizet þ a3Growtht þ a4Leveraget þ a5Qratiot þ a6Age
þa7ind adj cashþ a8D AuditQualityt þ a9D UnderwriterQualityt þ et
:In Model (1), the dependent variable DAt represents the discretionary accruals of IPO ﬁrms in year t. We use a
cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model to calculate DAt. To obtain DAt, we ﬁrst use the listed companies in the
same industry as each IPO sample ﬁrm to estimate the parameters in the following equation:ACCt
At1
¼ b1
1
At1
þ b2
DREV t  DRECt
At1
þ b3
PPEt
At1
;where ACCt = NIt  CFOt, ACCt is total accruals in year t, NIt is total income in year t, CFOt is net cash ﬂow
from operations; At1 is total assets in year t  1; DREVt is change in sales between year t and year t  1;
DRECt represents the change in account receivables from t – 1 to t; PPEt is total ﬁxed assets in year t; and
et is the residual. We then insert the estimated coeﬃcients b^1, b^2 and b^3 into the following equation, to obtain
the non-discretionary accruals (NDAt) of sample ﬁrms in year t:NDAt=At1 ¼ b^1ð1=At1Þ þ b^2½ðDREV t  DRECtÞ=At1 þ b^3ðPPEt=At1Þ:
Next, we calculate the total accruals of sample ﬁrms in year t: ACCt = NIt  CFOt.
Finally, we obtain the discretionary accruals (DAt) of sample ﬁrms in year t using the following equation:DAt=At1 ¼ et ¼ ACCt=At1  NDAt=At1:
The dummy variable VC is the key variable. If a sample ﬁrm is supported by VC, VC equals 1, otherwise 0.
In this model, if the pre-IPO year and the IPO year regression results show that the coeﬃcient a1 is signiﬁ-
cantly negative or not signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient a1 in the post-IPO year is signiﬁcantly positive, then
VCs’ moral hazard is dominant. On the contrary, if the a1 coeﬃcients in the three regressions are all signiﬁ-
cantly negative, the VCs’ certiﬁcation/monitoring role is dominant.
Because ﬁnancial performance is a key factor in IPO decisions and whether a company can get support
from a VC is determined by its ﬁnancial performance, performance-matched discretionary accruals can con-
trol for the systematic diﬀerence between the performance of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPO ﬁrms.
Thus, performance-matched discretionary accruals are more relevant in this study. We also calculate perfor-
mance-matched discretionary accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) to measure earnings management, in accordance
with Morsﬁeld and Tan (2006). Performance-matched discretionary accruals are calculated as follows: ﬁrst, we
obtain the ROA of each listed company for each year from 2005 to 2009; and second, we match each sample
ﬁrm with a non-IPO ﬁrm with the same one-digit SIC4 code and that has the closest ROA to the sample ﬁrm.r each sample ﬁrm in industries with the SIC code C, we select an ROA-matched ﬁrm from the sample ﬁrms with the same two-digit
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accruals of each IPO ﬁrm and the discretionary accruals of the matched ﬁrm.
In addition, we control for a number of factors that may aﬀect earnings management, including the size of
the IPO company, growth, ﬁnancial leverage, quick ratio, cash ﬂow performance, ownership and the reputa-
tions of the IPO auditors and the underwriter. Our reasoning is as follows. First, because ﬁrms with high
growth may lack cash, accruals and discretionary accruals in these ﬁrms may be larger. Second, ﬁrms with
higher ﬁnancial leverage receive more monitoring from debtors, so their earnings management will be lower.
Third, the quick ratio represents short-term ﬁnancial ﬂexibility; ﬁrms with more ﬁnancial ﬂexibility may have
more cash and lower accruals, and this will further inﬂuence their discretionary accruals. Fourth, given that
net income is constant, the adequacy of cash ﬂow directly aﬀects the level of accruals, thus aﬀecting the level of
discretionary accruals. Fifth, accounting information quality will be better if the company is audited by more
reputable auditors, and the underwriter’s reputation may inﬂuence the choice of auditor. Seventh, diﬀerent
ownership may also aﬀect earnings management, as documented in previous studies. Finally, ﬁrm size can
proxy for a ﬁrm’s resources to inﬂuence accounting earnings.
We recognize that Model (1) does not control for the endogeneity problem arising from sample self-selec-
tion, because a VC’s choice to invest in a certain ﬁrm may not be random. The control variables in Model (1)
cannot reﬂect this tendency. Therefore, even when earnings management has no relationship with VC partic-
ipation, the regression result may still show that VC participation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on earnings manage-
ment, and vice versa.
For example, we assume the following equation:Y ¼ b  X þ d  C þ e;
where Y represents earnings management, C is a dummy variable that equals 1 for listed companies that re-
ceive VC support and 0 otherwise, and X is a proxy for all other factors that may inﬂuence earnings manage-
ment. Because the decision of a VC is based on a number of factors, we use a related model to reﬂect this
decision:C ¼ c  W þ t;
where C is an unobserved latent variable. The decision we observe is C = 1, if C> 0, otherwise C = 0.
If this sample self-selection problem exists, the coeﬃcient d we estimate by OLS will not measure the eﬀect
of the participation of VCs appropriately. In empirical studies, this self-selection problem can be solved by
using a treatment eﬀect model (Greene, 2003).
We use a self-selection model to control for this potential endogeneity problem. Speciﬁcally, the participa-
tion of VCs may be aﬀected by sales per share, net assets per share, total assets per share and other ﬁnancial
factors of portfolio ﬁrms (Morsﬁed and Tan, 2005). It may also be inﬂuenced by industry factors, as VCs tend
to invest in ﬁrms in high-tech industries (Lee and Wahal, 2004). Therefore, we use a dummy variable to cap-
ture whether the sample ﬁrms are in a high-tech industry. Finally, according to Lerner (1995), VCs tend to
invest in ﬁrms close to their geographical location to reduce their costs. Because VCs in China are concen-
trated in Beijing, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang, a dummy variable is used to proxy for whether the
sample ﬁrms are registered in such provinces. We regress VC on the above ﬁve variables to estimate the
self-selection model.
Table 2 shows the deﬁnitions of the variables used in this paper.
4. Empirical results
4.1. The participation of VCs in earnings management of IPO ﬁrms
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables. In summary, both discre-
tionary accruals estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model and performance-matched discretionary
accruals in the pre-IPO, IPO and post-IPO years tend to increase at ﬁrst and then decline. They peak in the
IPO year and are higher in the post-IPO year than in the year before the IPO. Discretionary accruals estimated
by a cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model are positive in all three consecutive years, signiﬁcant at the 5%, 1%
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable name Deﬁnition
Dependent variables
DA Discretionary accruals in year t, estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model
Performance-match_da Following Kothari et al. (2005), the diﬀerence between the discretionary accruals of the sample ﬁrm and
that of a ROA-matched ﬁrm in year t
Independent variable
VC Dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm receives VC support, otherwise 0
Control variables
Control Dummy variable representing the ownership of the controlling shareholder in year t, equal to 1 if
controlled by a non-state entity, otherwise 0
Size Firm size, equal to ln(total assets) in year t
Growth Growth rate, calculated as the change in sales between year t and year t  1
Leverage Asset-liability ratio, calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets in year t
Qratio Quick ratio, calculated as quick assets divided by current liabilities in year t
Age The number of years between the year in which a portfolio ﬁrm was founded and its IPO year
Ind_adj_cash Dummy variable that equals 1 if the amount of cash ﬂow in year t is larger than the median cash ﬂow of
the same industry, otherwise 0
D_auditquality Dummy variable representing the audit quality of portfolio ﬁrms, equal to 1 if ranked in the top 10,
otherwise 0
D_underwriterquality Dummy variable representing IPO underwriter quality, equal to 1 if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0
Z. Hu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 251–268 259and 1% levels, respectively. However, only performance-matched discretionary accruals in the IPO year are
positive at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Performance-matched discretionary accruals are negative in the pre-
IPO year and positive in the post-IPO year. In summary, we conclude that sample ﬁrms manage earnings dur-
ing the IPO process, especially in the year of the IPO and the year in which the lock-up period expires.
Except for controlling shareholders, the lock-up period for other insiders, including management, is 1 year
in China. For ﬁrms listed in the ﬁrst half of the year, accounting earnings at the end of the IPO year will
directly inﬂuence the selling price, so they have an incentive to increase accounting earnings in the IPO year.
However, for those listed in the second half of the year, accounting earnings in the year following the IPO will
have more of an eﬀect. Therefore, to analyze the incentives of earnings management in the IPO year and the
following year, we further divide our sample into two subsamples according to whether they were listed in the
ﬁrst or second half of the year. We also deﬁne a ﬁrm as having high earnings management if its discretionary
accruals are above the sample median. We then investigate the relationship between earnings management and
the time of listing. We ﬁnd that in the IPO year, for ﬁrms listed in the ﬁrst half of the year, the proportion of
high earnings management ﬁrms – measured by discretionary accruals estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed
Jones model (performance-matched discretionary accruals) – is 61.9% (58.65%). For ﬁrms listed in the second
half of the year, the proportion is 43.98% (45.83%) and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) level. In the
year of the lock-up period expiration, the proportion of ﬁrms deﬁned as having high earnings management –
measured by discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model – is 43.26%. For
ﬁrms listed in the second half of the year, the proportion is 53.24% and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the
10% level. The results for performance-matched discretionary accruals show the same pattern: the proportion
of ﬁrms listed in the ﬁrst half of the year that are deﬁned as having high earnings management is 48.07%, com-
pared with 50.92% for ﬁrms listed in the second half of the year, although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant.5
Thus, we document the inﬂuence of the lock-up period on earnings management.
We further compare the earnings management of VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that,
similar to the results for the full sample, both discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modi-
ﬁed Jones model and performance-matched discretionary accruals for VC-backed ﬁrms and non-VC-backed
ﬁrms tend to increase ﬁrst and then decline, reaching their highest point in the IPO year. Speciﬁcally, for5 Due to space limitations, we do not report this result.
Table 3
The eﬀect of VCs on portfolio ﬁrms. This table presents the results for the eﬀect of VC participation on portfolio ﬁrms. DA is the
discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO year, the IPO year and the post-IPO year, estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model;
performance-match_da represents the diﬀerence between the discretionary accruals of the sample ﬁrm and that of a ROA-matched ﬁrm in
the pre-IPO year, the IPO year, and the post-IPO year, according to Kothari et al. (2005); Size is the ln(assets) in year t; Growth is the rate
of sales growth, calculated as the change in sales between year t and t  1; Leverage is the assets–liability ratio, deﬁned as total liability/
total assets; Qratio is the quick ratio, deﬁned as quick assets/current liabilities; Age is calculated as the number of years from the founding
of a portfolio ﬁrm to its IPO year; Ind-adj_cash is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the amount of cash ﬂow in year t is larger than the
median cash ﬂow of the same industry, otherwise 0; D_Auditquality is a dummy variable representing the audit quality of portfolio ﬁrms;
it equals 1 if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0; D_underwriterquality is a dummy variable representing IPO underwriter quality; it equals 1
if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0.
Year Total sample (320) VC-backed (112) Non-VC-backed (208) Diﬀerence
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (t-value)
DA (t-value) 1 0.019** (2.418) 0.139 0.013 (0.867) 0.164 0.022** (2.529) 0.123 0.5
0 0.063*** (7.234) 0.155 0.053*** (3.943) 0.143 0.067*** (6.061) 0.161 0.779
1 0.020*** (2.995) 0.12 0.023 *** (3.357) 0.073 0.019* (1.911) 0.139 0.34
Performance-match_da (t-
value)
1 0.013 (1.359) 0.17 0.020 (1.075) 0.201 0.009 (0.848) 0.151 0.578
0 0.048*** (4.846) 0.171 0.043*** (2.648) 0.176 0.050*** (4.057) 0.178 0.03
1 0.001 (0.057) 0.302 0.010 (1.092) 0.099 0.005 (0.401) 0.171 0.851
Size 1 19.950 0.773 19.778 0.6708 20.043 0.81 2.951***
0 20.648 0.670 20.616 0.623 20.666 0.694 0.626
1 20.808 0.705 20.768 0.677 20.83 0.721 0.743
Growth 1 0.319 0.331 0.370 0.405 0.292 0.281 2.017 **
0 0.279 0.425 0.296 0.544 0.27 0.345 0.535
1 0.253 0.355 0.268 0.274 0.245 0.393 0.548
Leverage 1 0.519 0.156 0.484 0.152 0.538 0.154 3.001***
0 0.314 0.176 0.273 0.161 0.336 0.18 3.100***
1 0.341 0.18 0.305 0.168 0.361 0.184 2.689***
Qratio 1 1.143 0.88 1.411 1.126 0.999 0.673 4.090***
0 4.096 5.831 5.132 6.036 3.539 5.654 2.347**
1 3.217 4.962 4.159 6.591 2.710 3.730 2.511**
Ind_adj_cash 1 0.275 0.447 0.259 0.44 0.284 0.452 0.471
0 0.272 0.446 0.259 0.44 0.279 0.45 0.381
1 0.281 0.45 0.227 0.421 0.309 0.463 1.546
Age 0 3.139 0.336 3.078 0.364 3.172 0.316 2.407**
D_audit_quality 0 0.253 0.436 0.188 0.392 0.289 0.454 1.987**
D_underwriter_quality 0 0.459 0.499 0.545 0.500 0.414 0.494 2.257**
Note:
* 10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% Signiﬁcance level.
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VC-backed ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly positive in both the IPO year and the post-IPO year, and is higher in the
post-IPO year (the year of the lock-up period) than in the pre-IPO year. Although the earnings management
of non-VC-backed ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly positive in all three consecutive years, it is lower in the post-IPO year
than in the pre-IPO year. The earnings management pattern of VC-backed ﬁrms is also similar for perfor-
mance-matched discretionary accruals. It is signiﬁcantly positive in the IPO year, not signiﬁcantly negative
in the pre-IPO year and positive in post-IPO year. The pattern of earnings management of non-VC-backed
ﬁrms is slightly diﬀerent. It is signiﬁcantly positive in the IPO year and not signiﬁcantly negative in the
pre-IPO or the post-IPO year. In summary, the results of the discretionary accruals estimated by a cross-
sectional modiﬁed Jones model and performance-matched discretionary accruals show that earnings
Z. Hu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 251–268 261management is lower in VC-backed than non-VC-backed ﬁrms before the expiration of the lock-up period,
but the earnings management of VC-backed ﬁrms reverses after the expiration of the lock-up period. The
earnings management of VC-backed ﬁrms is higher than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms in the year the lock-
up period expires, although not signiﬁcantly.
The size of VC-backed ﬁrms is smaller in all 3 years. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the pre-
IPO year, but not signiﬁcant in the other 2 years. The growth rate of VC-backed ﬁrms is higher in all 3 years,
especially in the pre-IPO year, at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Meanwhile, VC-backed ﬁrms are younger at the 5%
signiﬁcance level. This ﬁnding is in accordance with the Grandstanding hypothesis proposed by Gompers
(1996), which suggests that to signal their IPO performance, younger VCs tend to take younger portfolio ﬁrms
to IPO. VC-backed ﬁrms also have more reputable underwriters. The reputations of VC-backed ﬁrms are
higher than those of non-backed ﬁrms at the 5% signiﬁcance level, in accordance with the ﬁndings of
Chemmanur and Loutskina (2007). This implies that VCs help portfolio ﬁrms with IPO marketing in China’s
market. However, the reputations of their auditors are lower than those of non-VC-backed ﬁrms, because VCs
tend to choose lower quality auditors for the convenience of earnings management.
Finally, due to the support of VCs, the IPO ﬁrms backed by VCs have higher ﬁnancial ﬂexibility, more
short-term and long-term solvency, signiﬁcantly lower ﬁnancial leverage in the pre-IPO and the IPO year,
and a higher quick ratio in all 3 years, signiﬁcant at the 1%, 1% and 5% levels respectively, and less adequate
operational cash ﬂow.
4.2. Regression results
The regression results for Hypothesis 1, reported in Table 4, show that for all 3 years, VC has no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals (estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed
Jones model) and performance-matched discretionary accruals, without controlling for the sample self-selec-
tion problem. The regression coeﬃcients of discretionary accruals estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed
Jones model (performance-matched discretionary accruals) on VC, a1, are 0.014 (0.009) and 0.014
(0.007) in the pre-IPO and the IPO year, respectively, and 0.012 (0.024) in the post-IPO year. All of these
are non-signiﬁcant, after controlling for sample ﬁrms’ characteristics and underwriter and auditor reputation.
However, if we consider the pattern over the 3 years, we can conjecture that VCs in China’s market tend to
inﬂuence the management of portfolio ﬁrms by lowering earnings management before the expiration of the
lock-up period. By reversing accounting earnings in the post-IPO year, they will realize higher investment
returns when they cash in their equity at the end of the lock-up period. Thus, moral hazard plays a more
important role than the certiﬁcation/monitoring role.
The ﬁfth to seventh and tenth to thirteenth column report the second-stage regression results of the treat-
ment eﬀect model, controlling for the sample self-selection problem. Due to space limitations, we do not report
the ﬁrst-stage probit regression results. In general, the overall LR chi2 of the regressions are 49.8, 50.33 and
49.56 for the 3 years, respectively. They are all signiﬁcant below the 1% level and the Pseudo R2 are 12.23%,
12.36% and 12.17% respectively. In all three probit regressions, the dummy variables – high-tech and geo-
graphical location – are signiﬁcantly positive below the 5% level.
After controlling for the sample self-selection problem, the signiﬁcance of the overall equation improves. In
particular, in the regression for the post-IPO year, with performance-matched discretionary accruals as the
dependent variable, the overall signiﬁcance of the equation changes from insigniﬁcant to signiﬁcant at the
10% level. The second-stage results show that VC participation aﬀects the earnings management pattern
before and after the expiration of the lock-up period. In the regression of discretionary accruals estimated
using a cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model, the regression coeﬃcients a1 remain insigniﬁcantly negative
in the pre-IPO year and the IPO year, whereas the a1 coeﬃcient is 0.102 in the year the lock-up period expires
and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In the regression with performance-matched discretionary accruals as the
dependent variable, the regression coeﬃcient a1 in the pre-IPO year is 0.136, signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
In the IPO year, the earnings management of VC-backed companies is still less than that of non-VC-backed
ﬁrms. However, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant, due to the increased earnings management by the ﬁrms listed
in the ﬁrst half of the year to boost accounting earnings after the expiration of the lock-up period. In the year
the lock-up period expires, the participation of VCs has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the earnings management of
Table 4
The eﬀect of the participation of VCs on earnings management. This table reports the regression results for VC participation on the earnings management of IPO ﬁrms in the pre-
IPO year, the IPO year and the post-IPO year. DA is the discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO, the IPO, and the post-IPO year, estimated by a cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model;
Performance-match_da represents the diﬀerence between the discretionary accruals of the sample ﬁrm and that of a ROA-matched ﬁrm in the pre-IPO year, the IPO year, and post-
IPO year, according to Kothari et al. (2005); Control is a dummy variable representing the ownership of controlling shareholders in year t, which equals 1 if controlled by a non-
state entity; Size is the ln(assets) in year t; Growth is the rate of sales growth, calculated as the change in sales between year t and year t  1; Leverage is the assets-liability ratio,
deﬁned as total liability/total assets; Qratio is quick ratio, deﬁned as quick assets/current liabilities; Age is calculated as the number of years from the founding of portfolio ﬁrms to
their IPO year; Ind-adj_cash is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the amount of cash ﬂow in year t is larger than the median cash ﬂow of the same industry, otherwise 0;
D_Auditquality is a dummy variable representing the audit quality of portfolio ﬁrms, which equals 1 if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0; D_underwriterquality is a dummy variable
representing IPO underwriter quality, which equals 1 if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0.
DA DA (controlling for self-selection) Performance-match_da Performance-match_da
(controlling for self-selection)
Pre-IPO
year
IPO
year
Post-IPO
year
Pre- IPO
year
IPO year Post-IPO
year
Pre-IPO
year
IPO
year
Post-IPO
year
Pre-IPO
year
IPO year Post-IPO
year
VC (t-value/z-value) .014 .014 0.012 0.065 0.067 0.102** .009 .007 .024 0.136** 0.091 0.086*
(0.89) (0.82) (0.85) (1.42) (1.34) (2.35) (0.49) (0.39) (1.35) (2.28) (1.52) (1.69)
Control (t-value/z-value) .016 .038* 0.041** 0.030 0.045** 0.037** .015 .015 .028 0.001 0.026 0.028
(0.9) (1.94) (2.48) (1.58) (2.19) (2.13) (0.68) (0.67) (1.36) (0.03) (1.10) (1.30)
Size (t-value/z-value) .039*** .042*** 0.016 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.012 .038** .050*** .019 0.035** 0.052*** 0.015
(2.78) (2.98) (1.46) (2.66) (2.91) (1.11) (2.23) (2.95) (1.42) (2.08) (2.98) (1.09)
Growth (t-value/z-value) .037 .003 0.065*** 0.010 0.005 0.071*** .039 .025 .055** 0.020 0.029 0.061**
(1.62) (0.17) (3.40) (0.45) (0.30) (3.74) (1.36) (1.08) (2.29) (0.70) (1.27) (2.52)
Leverage (t-value/z-value) .176** .002 0.009 0.174** 0.009 0.030 .070 .034 .023 0.087 0.049 0.037
(2.13) (0.04) (0.18) (2.09) (0.14) (0.57) (0.69) (0.44) (0.36) (0.83) (0.61) (0.56)
Qratio (t-value/z-value) .002 .003* 0.001 0.0001 0.002* 0.001 .010 .004* .001 0.016 0.003* 0.001
(0.19) (1.92) (0.46) (0.00) (1.74) (0.86) (0.66) (1.96) (0.27) (1.08) (1.68) (0.48)
Age (t-value/z-value) .013 .024 0.029 0.002 0.022 0.033 .068** .009 .026 0.057* 0.006 0.029
(0.55) (0.97) (1.39) (0.10) (0.92) (1.60) (2.34) (0.31) (1.00) (1.95) (0.22) (1.11)
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Ind_adj_cash (t-value/z-value) .116*** .151*** 0.014 0.119*** 0.155*** 0.009 .132*** .140*** .016 0.133*** 0.149*** 0.012
(6.37) (7,89) (1.01) (6.63) (8.11) (0.62) (5.90) (6.09) (0.87) (6.02) (6.51) (0.69)
D_Auditquality (t-value/z-value) .033* .024 0.006 0.031* 0.018 0.008 .032 .019 .006 0.025 0.016 0.010
(1.957) (1.31) (0.40) (1.84) (0.98) (0.56) (1.52) (0.90) (0.34) (1.19) (0.73) (0.52)
D_underwriterquality (t-value/z-
value)
.005 .015 0.026* 0.005 0.013 0.022* .015 .033* .036* 0.016 0.028 0.035**
(0.38) (0.98) (1.89) (0.35) (0.82) (1.69) (082) (1.73) (2.1) (0.88) (1.48) (2.04)
Constant (t-value/z-value) .683*** .855*** 0.417* 0.593** 0.837** 0.389 .915*** .962*** .503 0.790** 0.966*** 0.447
(2.61) (2.90) (1.79) (2.29) (2.81) (1.64) (2.85) (273) (1.72) (2.43) (2.70) (1.50)
N 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320
F (Wald chi2) 4.92*** 8.29*** 2.33** 53.51 87.31 28.4 4.93*** 4.93*** 1.44 55.15 55.12 16.61
Adjust R2 (Prob > chi2) 10.95% 18.60% 3.72% 0.000 0.000 0.002 10.96% 10.96% 1.37% 0.000 0.000 0.083
Note:
* 10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% Signiﬁcance level.
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264 Z. Hu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 251–268portfolio ﬁrms, with the earnings management of VC-backed ﬁrms higher than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms
at the 10% signiﬁcance level.
In addition, unreported results show that the ROA (industry-median-adjusted ROA) of VC-backed ﬁrms in
the pre-IPO year is 14.2% (11.2%), which is signiﬁcantly higher than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms – 11.9%
(9%) – at the 1% (1%) level. In Table 3, we ﬁnd that the growth rate of VC-backed ﬁrms in the pre-IPO year
is 37%, compared with 29.2% for non-VC-backed ﬁrms. Therefore, reducing earnings management in the pre-
IPO year will not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on IPO pricing. If we consider the earnings management from the
pre-IPO year to the post-IPO year together, we can infer that the participation of VCs reduces earnings man-
agement before the expiration of the lock-up period to reverse accounting earnings in the year the lock-up
period expires. For this reason, under our current background, the imperfect market system means that
VCs participating in IPOs have no incentive to monitor portfolio ﬁrms, their participation is more for spec-
ulative purposes. They collude with the management of portfolio ﬁrms or put pressure on the management to
lower discretionary accruals before the expiration of the lock-up period in return for the reverse in accounting
earnings once the lock-up period expires, which ultimately has a negative eﬀect on the market. Thus, our
empirical results support the moral hazard hypothesis.
The regression results also show that the earnings management of non-state-owned enterprises is higher
than that of state-owned enterprises during the three consecutive years. In particular, in the regression model
with discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model as the dependent variable,
the coeﬃcients for VC in the IPO year and the post-IPO year are 0.045 and 0.037 respectively, both signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. This implies that the governance of state-owned enterprises is better than that of non-state-
owned enterprises, in accordance with Gao and Cai (2011). In addition, larger ﬁrms have more resources
to manage earnings, so they tend to have higher earnings management. The regression coeﬃcients for discre-
tionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model (performance-matched discretionary
accruals) on ﬁrm size in the pre-IPO and the IPO year are 0.036 (0.035) and 0.042 (0.052), signiﬁcant at
the 1% (5%) and 1% (1%) levels. Firms with lower growth rates have more incentive to increase growth by
means of earnings management, which is more obvious in the year the lock-up period expires. The regression
coeﬃcients for discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model (performance-
matched discretionary accruals) on growth are 0.071 (0.061) respectively, signiﬁcant at the 1% (5%) level.
Furthermore, older ﬁrms of lower quality (Xue, 2002) tend to have higher earnings management. The regres-
sion coeﬃcient for performance-matched discretionary accruals on age is 0.057, signiﬁcant at the 10% level in
the pre-IPO year. Meanwhile, ﬁrms with lower ﬁnancial leverage receive less monitoring from debtors, which
leads to higher earnings management. The regression coeﬃcient for discretionary accruals estimated by the
cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model on ﬁnancial leverage is 0.174, signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the pre-
IPO year. As predicted, ﬁrms with worse operational cash ﬂow tend to have higher earnings management.
Finally, auditors and underwriters do not inhibit earnings management.
Because VCs increase earnings in the year the lock-up period expires to obtain higher equity selling prices,
high earnings management inevitably leads to more frequent equity selling. To test this direct result of earn-
ings management, we analyze equity selling by VCs in the post-IPO year. The results show that 54 ﬁrms incur
equity selling by VCs in the post-IPO year, accounting for 62.92% of the sample ﬁrms with lock-up periods of
1 year. Among them, 18 ﬁrms (22.32%) incur equity selling on the day of the expiration of the lock-up period.
Thus, the moral hazard hypothesis is further supported.
To investigate whether there is a diﬀerent eﬀect of VC participation on earnings management for ﬁrms with
diﬀerent ownership, we divide the total sample into state-owned and non-state-owned subsamples. The results
before controlling for sample self-selection show that in general, the participation of VCs has no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on earnings management.6 Speciﬁcally, when the dependent variable is discretionary accruals estimated
by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model, the regression results for both state-owned and non-state-owned
ﬁrms tend to be similar. In the pre-IPO and the IPO year, the participation of VCs has a negative relationship
with earnings management, but the relationship turns positive in the post-IPO year, although not signiﬁcantly.
However, in the performance-matched discretionary accruals regression, the participation of VCs has a6 Because of space limitations, we do not report this result.
Table 5
The eﬀect of the participation of VCs on earnings management: subsample regressions. This table reports the regression results for VC participation on the earnings management of stated-owned
and non-state-owned IPO ﬁrms in the pre-IPO year, the IPO year, and the post-IPO year. DA is the discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO, the IPO, and the post-IPO year, estimated by a cross-
sectional modiﬁed Jones model; Performance-match_da represents the diﬀerence between the discretionary accruals of the sample ﬁrm and that of a ROA-matched ﬁrm in the pre-IPO, the IPO,
and the post-IPO year, according to Kothari et al. (2005); Size is the ln(assets) in year t; Growth is the rate of sales growth, calculated as the change in sales between year t and year t  1; Leverage
is the assets–liability ratio, deﬁned as total liability/total assets; Qratio is the quick ratio, deﬁned as quick assets/current liabilities; Age is calculated as the number of years from the founding of
portfolio ﬁrms to their IPO year; Ind-adj_cash is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the amount of cash ﬂow in year t is larger than the median cash ﬂow of the same industry, 1, otherwise 0;
D_Auditquality is a dummy variable representing the audit quality of portfolio ﬁrms, which equals 1 if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0; D_underwriterquality is a dummy variable representing
IPO underwriter quality, which equals 1 if ranked in the top 10, otherwise 0.
DA Performance-match_da
1 year before IPO IPO year 1 year after IPO 1 year before IPO IPO year 1 year after IPO
State-
owned
Non-state-
owned
State-
owned
Non-state-
owned
State-
owned
Non-state-
owned
State-
owned
Non-state-
owned
State-
owned
Non-state-
owned
State-
owned
Non-state-
owned
VC (z-value) 0.046 0.074 0.015 0.071 0.019 0.131** 0.076 0.155** 0.058 0.062 0.0003 0.133**
(1.15) (1.30) (0.41) (1.12) (0.41) (2.44) (1.14) (2.17) (1.24) (0.85) (0.01) (2.03)
Size (z-value) 0.021 0.042** 0.030* 0.047*** 0.001 0.021 0.028 0.041** 0.022 0.051** 0.042* 0.020
(1.33) (2.39) (1.83) (2.64) (0.08) (1.56) (1.11) (1.96) (1.13) (2.48) (1.81) (1.17)
Growth (z-value) 0.110*** 0.013 0.019 0.001 0.008 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.006 0.003 0.0240 0.057 0.058**
(3.97) (0.47) (0.79) (0.08) (0.18) (3.60) (2.64) (0.18) (0.10) (0.91) (1.07) (2.17)
Leverage (z-value) 0.140 0.212* 0.009 0.021 0.027 0.036 0.003 0.125 0.005 0.060 0.064 0.050
(1.58) (1.89) (0.13) (0.24) (0.30) (0.54) (0.03) (0.92) (0.06) (0.58) (0.62) (0.59)
Qratio (z-value) 0.028 0.008 0.009 0.004* 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.011 0.001 0.005* 0.620 0.001
(1.61) (0.52) (1.28) (1.66) (0.46) (0.96) (1.39) (0.63) (1.16) (1.76) (0.00) (0.66)
Age (z-value) 0.015 0.001 0.036 0.043 0.019 0.042* 0.084* 0.047 0.070* 0.009 0.780 0.038
(0.49) (0.02) (1.09) (1.49) (0.49) (1.77) (1.68) (1.38) (1.71) (0.29) (0.03) (0.23)
Ind_adj_cash (z-value) 0.069*** 0.137*** 0.123*** 0.167*** 0.069** 0.001 0.106 0.143*** 0.072*** 0.134*** 0.74*** 0.012
(3.52) (5.96) (5.61) (7.05) (2.39) (0.02) (3.47) (5.24) (2.67) (4.90) (0.11) (0.55)
D_auditquality (z-value) 0.034 0.031 0.032 0.038* 0.007 0.020 0.011 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.029
(1.52) (1.46) (1.40) (1.73) (0.26) (1.12) (0.32) (1.34) (1.08) (1.40) (1.11) (1.27)
D_underwriterquality (z-
value)
0.010 0.001 0.019 0.009 0.014 0.026* 0.014 0.011 0.049** 0.021 0.010 0.041**
(0.57) (0.03) (1.03) (0.47) (0.63) (1.68) (0.51) (0.50) (2.12) (0.95) (0.41) (2.02)
Constant 0.421 0.633* 0.432 0.948*** 0.010 0.570** 0.859* 0.838** 0.713* 0.941** 0.940** 0.558
(z-value) (1.34) (1.97) (1.33) (2.59) (0.02) (2.01) (1.71) (2.16) (1.80) (2.23) (1.96) (1.56)
N 74 246 74 246 74 246 74 246 74 246 74 246
Wald chi2 38.45 41.29 37.32 72.45 11.43 26.10 27.12 42.05 19.10 37.81 17.89 16.97
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.247 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.037 0.049
Note:
* 10% Signiﬁcance level.
** 5% Signiﬁcance level.
*** 1% Signiﬁcance level.
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266 Z. Hu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 251–268positive inﬂuence on the earnings management of state-owned enterprises in the three consecutive years. For
non-state-owned enterprises, VC participation has a negative eﬀect on earnings management in the pre-IPO
year, but a positive inﬂuence in the other 2 years.
Table 5 shows the second-stage regression results after controlling for sample self-selection. Due to space
limitations, we do not report the ﬁrst-stage probit regression results. The overall LR chi2 of the three regres-
sions on the state-owned sample are 26.81, 29.45 and 26.32 respectively, all signiﬁcant below the 1% level. The
Pseudo R2 are 30%, 32.96% and 29.46% respectively. The dummy variables – high-tech and geographical loca-
tion – are signiﬁcantly positive below the 1% level in the regressions for each of the 3 years. For non-
state-owned enterprises, the overall LR chi2 for the three regressions are 34.85, 35.49 and 35.36 respectively,
all below the 1% level. The Pseudo R2 are 10.79%, 10.99% and 10.94% respectively. The dummy variables –
high-tech and geographical location – are also signiﬁcantly positive in the regressions for all 3 years and
signiﬁcant below the 1%, 1% and 10% levels.
According to Table 5, in the state-owned sample, the participation of VCs has a weak eﬀect on earnings
management in all 3 years. None of the regression coeﬃcients for earnings management on VC a1 are signif-
icant. In the regression of discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model, it
seems that VC participation weakly reduces earnings management in the pre-IPO and the IPO year, with
the gap between VC-backed and non-VC-backed ﬁrms narrowing. In the post-IPO year, the earnings
management of VC-backed ﬁrms is higher than that of non-VC-backed ﬁrms. For the regression of perfor-
mance-matched discretionary accruals, none of the regression coeﬃcients for earnings management on VC
a1 are signiﬁcant. VC participation weakly reduces earnings management in the pre-IPO and the post-IPO
years, and increases it in the IPO year.
For non-state-owned enterprises, VC participation signiﬁcantly inﬂuences earnings management in the
post-IPO year. In the pre-IPO year, VC participation reduces performance-matched discretionary accruals
at the 5% signiﬁcance level and also reduces discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed
Jones model. Although insigniﬁcant, the regression coeﬃcients for discretionary accruals estimated by the
cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model (performance-matched discretionary accruals) on VC a1 are 0.155
(0.074). In the IPO year, the reduction in earnings management as a result of VC participation is further
weakened. The regression coeﬃcients for discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed
Jones model (performance-matched discretionary accruals) on VC a1 are 0.071 (0.062), both not signiﬁ-
cant. However, in the post-IPO year, the participation of VCs increases the earnings management of portfolio
ﬁrms and the regression coeﬃcients for discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones
model (performance-matched discretionary accruals) on VC a1 are 0.131 (0.133), signiﬁcant at the 5% (5%)
level. Combined with the discussion on Hypothesis 1, we believe that the participation of VCs in non-state-
owned enterprises, compared with state-owned enterprises, has more eﬀect on earnings management before
and after the expiration of the lock-up period. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also supported.
We also conduct the following robustness tests: ﬁrst, we use the Jones model to estimate earnings manage-
ment; second, we measure ﬁrm size by sales; and third, we use growth in net income as a proxy for the growth
of IPO ﬁrms. The results are consistent with those reported.
5. Conclusions
We use a sample of IPO ﬁrms in the SME Board and GEM between 2005 and 2009, and establish a two-
stage treatment eﬀect model to control for the sample self-selection problem. We investigate the participation
of VCs in the earnings management of portfolio ﬁrms in the year before IPO, the IPO year and the year after
IPO. We reach the following conclusions.
(1) To increase accounting earnings in the year in which the lock-up period expires, the participation of VCs
lowers earnings management, especially in the pre-IPO year, and increases earnings management in the
post-IPO year.
(2) Compared with state-owned IPO companies, the participation of VCs has more eﬀect on earnings man-
agement before and after the expiration of the lock-up period in non-state-owned enterprises. In the sub-
sample of state-owned enterprises, VC participation has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on earnings management
Z. Hu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 251–268 267from the pre-IPO year to the post-IPO year. However, for non-state-owned enterprises, the participation
of VCs signiﬁcantly reduces earnings management in the pre-IPO year. This results in a signiﬁcant rever-
sal in discretionary accruals estimated by the cross-sectional modiﬁed Jones model and performance-
matched discretionary accruals in the year of the expiration of lock-up period.
Thus, we provide a comprehensive investigation of the eﬀect of the participation of VCs on the accounting
information quality of IPO ﬁrms before and after the expiration of the lock-up period. We reach the conclu-
sion that under China’s current institutional background, the involvement of VCs in IPO ﬁrms reﬂects a moral
hazard role rather than a certiﬁcation/monitoring role. This conclusion is important for the decision making
of investors and policymakers. First, due to self-interest, the participation of VCs is more for speculative pur-
poses. They collude with the management of portfolio companies or put pressure on the portfolio ﬁrms’ man-
agement using their own professional advantages and social networks, to reduce earnings management before
the expiration of the lock-up period and to reverse accounting earnings after the expiration of the lock-up per-
iod. Investors, therefore, should not blindly follow the behavior of VCs. Second, to increase the incentive of
VCs to positively monitor their portfolio ﬁrms, regulators should not only strengthen the supervision of VCs
and establish appropriate punishment mechanisms to regulate their speculative behavior, but should also
establish guidance and motivation systems to increase VCs’ motivation to obtain investment returns by pro-
viding R&D support, help with sales and purchase channels, management improvements and other value-
added services. Finally, government should improve the ﬁnancing environment of non-state-owned enterprises
and establish appropriate mechanisms to solve the problem of ﬁnancing bottlenecks in non-state-owned enter-
prises so that the negative eﬀects of venture capitalists’ involvement in non-state-owned enterprises can be
reduced.
As this paper does not test the eﬀect of reputation and other characteristics of VCs on the accounting infor-
mation quality of IPO ﬁrms, this would be an interesting future research direction.
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